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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL INTEGRITY RATIONALE FOR THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE REJECTED
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
In United States v. Janis,' the United States Supreme Court refused
to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence unconstitutionally
seized by state officials and subsequently used in federal court to sustain
a civil tax assessment.
Pursuant to a search warrant, state officials investigating illegal
gambling activities seized wagering records and cash from respondent's
premises,2 and notified the Internal Revenue Service of the seizure.
The IRS made an assessment against respondent for unpaid wagering
taxes,4 and levied upon the cash seized by the state officials in partial
satisfaction of the assessment.' After a state court declared the war-
rant invalid and excluded the fruits of the unlawful search from state
criminal proceedings," respondent sued in federal district court to quash
the tax assessment and obtain a refund of the cash held by the IRS.7
The Government conceded that the tax assessment rested solely on the
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search.8 After determining
independently that the search warrant was invalid, the district court
excluded the evidence, quashed the assessment, and ordered a refund
of the seized cashY The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed;' 0 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, re-
versed, and held: Evidence seized by state officials in violation of
1. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
2. Id. at 434-36.
3. Id. at 436.
4. Id. at 437.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 438.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 439.
10. Id.
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the fourth amendment is admissible in civil proceedings in federal
courts.
11
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by public officials.' 2
Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is generally
inadmissible against the victim of the unlawful search.'" The Supreme
Court first invoked this exclusionary rule in the 1886 case of Boyd v.
United States,'4 reversing a judgment'5 in a forfeiture proceeding based
largely on evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments.' The Court expanded the rule to require the exclusion of the
fruits of illegal searches and seizures in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,17 which held that a grand jury could not consider evi-
dence that the Government would not have discovered but for the
unlawful seizure: 8 "The essence of a provision forbidding the ac-
quisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all."' 9
The rationale for the exclusionary rule has never been entirely clear. 0
The Warren Court based its significant expansion of the rule on two
rationales. Of primary importance was the belief that excluding the
products of unlawful searches would deter law enforcement officials
from committing them in the future, "compel[ling] respect for the con-
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing
11. Id. at 459-60.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
13. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Id. at 638.
16. Id. at 634.
17. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
18. Id. at 390.
19. Id. at 392.
20. See generally Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 621.
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the incentive to disregard it."''  The Warren Court, however, also
emphasized that the demands of judicial integrity justified the rule.22
As early as 1942, the Court reasoned that the judiciary could not employ
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution without becoming
"accomplices in wilful disobedience of law. '23
The Burger Court has taken a more restrictive view of both rationales,
and accordingly, of the value of the exclusionary rule. Although the
Court has not completely rejected judicial integrity as a basis for the
rule,24 it has made it plain that the "prime purpose" of excluding ille-
gally obtained evidence "is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' 21
Moreover, the Burger Court has been far more skeptical of the deterrent
value of the exclusionary rule than the Warren Court,26 because of the
lack of reliable studies demonstrating its efficacy.27  This skepticism
has emerged in the form of a balancing analysis, weighing the magnitude
of the loss to society caused by exclusion of the evidence against the
.marginal deterrence" to police misconduct by application of the rule.2 8
In each case to which it has been applied, this "marginal deterrence"
21. Elkins v. United States, 362 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). See generally Geller, supra note 20, at 643-44.
22. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). See generally Geller, supra note 20, at 644-46.
23. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942).
24. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 536 (1975).
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); accord, Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
26. Compare decisions of the Warren Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), with decisions of the Burger Court in Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
27. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450-51 n.22 (1976) (citing Canon, Is the
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 Ky. LJ. 681 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); 47
Nw. U.L. R-v. 493 (1952)).
28. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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analysis has resulted in a decision to admit the evidence.2 9 This result
is entirely consistent with the Burger Court's belief that a correct assess-
ment of guilt or innocence is the primary purpose of the criminal trial.8 °
The degree to which the exclusionary rule applies to noncriminal
proceedings is unclear. The Constitution probably does not require
application of the rule in proceedings involving only private parties."1
When the Government is party to the litigation, however, most courts
exclude evidence illegally seized by government officials 2 in reliance
upon the Supreme Court's holding in Weeks v. United States's that the
fourth amendment's protection against illegal searches "reaches all
[citizens] alike, whether accused of crime or not. '3 4 Lower courts have
applied the deterrence rationale to civil as well as criminal actions,"
reasoning that without an exclusionary rule, "the Government would
be free to undertake unreasonable searches and seizures in all civil
cases without the possibility of unfavorable consequences." 86 A few
courts have reached a different result in post-trial criminal hearings
29. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
30. See 1976 WAsE. U.L.Q. 480, 482.
31. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1975); Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill
Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446 (D.D.C. 1965); Diener v. Mid-Am. Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d
509 (Mo. 1964); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83
(1964); Walker v. Penner, 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951). Contra, Del Presto v.
Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966); Williams v.
Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. of Clermont County 1966).
32. See Knoll Assocs. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (FTC action for Clay-
ton Act violation); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (action to dis-
charge civil service employee); Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938)
(action to recover liquor import duties); Anderson v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363
(S.D. Fla. 1973) (jeopardy assessment for unpaid income taxes); Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub. nom. Standard Oil
Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (class action suit for anti-trust violation);
United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967), a/Id, 405 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1968) (deficiency determination for income taxes); Suarez v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 792 (1972) (deficiency determination for income taxes due); Carson v.
State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (proceeding to abate gambling as a public
nuisance); Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d
440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969) (administrative proceeding for revocation of liquor
license).
33. 232U.S. 383 (1914).
34. Id. at 392.
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969); accord, United
States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/11
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on sentencing' and parole revocation,s and in employee discharge
hearings.:" The Sixth Circuit has allowed introduction of the fruits of
an illegal search in a civil tax proceeding wholly unconnected with any
criminal law violation.4"
Courts have unanimously applied the exclusionary rule when the
Government has attempted to use illegally seized evidence in a pro-
ceeding closely related to enforcing the criminal law." The Supreme
Court laid the groundwork for this practice in Boyd, a forfeiture pro-
ceeding for violation of the customs laws: "[P]roceedings instituted for
the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason
of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are
in their nature criminal."42  The Court reaffirmed and broadened this
rule in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,43 emphasizing that
forfeiture often imposes a greater penalty than criminal conviction. 4
The rule developed in these cases and applied in the lower courts, then,
looked to the substance rather than the form of the action. 5 If the
purpose of the proceeding was to enforce the criminal laws, the ex-
clusionary rule applied. 0 Because Congress unquestionably intended
37. E.g., United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 983 (1971).
38. E.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
39. E.g., Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1974). Contra, Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
40. Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'g 230 F. Supp. 91
(N.D. Ohio 1963).
41. See Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1971) (civil tax assessment
for wagering taxes); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969) (civil tax
assessment for wagering taxes); Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (lst Cir. 1965)
(forfeiture proceeding for money to be used in violation of revenue laws); United
States v. $5,608.30 in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964)
(forfeiture proceeding for money to be used in violation of IRS laws); United States
v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) (forfeiture of auto used to transport drugs);
United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (civil tax assessment for
wagering excise taxes); United States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,474 (D.D.C.
1966) (civil tax assessment for wagering taxes); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843
(W.D. Ky. 1962) (civil tax assessment for wagering taxes); Williams v. Williams, 8
Ohio M\1isc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. of Clermont County 1966).
42. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1885).
43. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
44. Id. at 700-01.
45. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile hearing looks for substance over
form).
46. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1969); Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v.Washington University Open Scholarship
132 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1977:127
the wagering excise tax to supplement state efforts to control or-
ganized gambling, 47 every court before Janis applied the exclusionary
rule to cases in which the IRS sought to introduce illegally obtained
evidence in support of a wagering tax assessment.48
Until 1949 neither the fourth amendment nor the exclusionary rule
applied to the states.49 A major consequence of this disparity between
state and federal law was the "silver platter" doctrine: Unrestrained
by the fourth amendment, state officials could legally conduct unrea-
sonable searches and present the evidence so obtained on a "silver
platter" to federal officials who themselves were constitutionally pro-
hibited from making the searches. ° Although Wolf v. Colorado1
$5,608.30 in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
47. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1951); SPECIAL
COMMrrrEE TO INvEsTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, REPORTS
ON CRIME GATIO N, S. REP. No. 141, 307, 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 97
CoNG. REc. 6892, 12231 (1951); Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1962); 20 BROOKLYN L REV. 119 (1953); 15 GA. B.J. 234
(1952); 67 HAv. L. REv. 164 (1953); 52 McH. L. REV. 150 (1953); 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 705 (1952); 28 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 550 (1953); 101 U. PA. L. REv. 877 (1953); 14
U. Prrr. L. REv. 71 (1972); 76 YALE L. J. 839 (1967).
48. See Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1971); Pizzarello v. United
States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1966); United States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,474 (D.D.C. 1966); Lassoff
v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
49. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
50. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter coined this
phrase in Lustig); see Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Gambino v.
United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Gilbert
v. United States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947); Rettich v. United States, 84 F.2d 118
(1st Cir. 1936); In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935); Fowler v. United States,
62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932); Miller v. United States, 50 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1931);
Brown v. United States, 12 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1926); Elam v. United States, 7 F.2d
887 (8th Cir. 1925); Riggs v. United States, 299 F. 273 (4th Cir. 1924); Timonen v.
United States, 286 F. 935 (6th Cir. 1923); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L REv. 1 (1950); Galler, The Exclusion of
Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 49 J. Csim. L.C. & P.S. 455 (1959); Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts,
43 MiNe. L. REv. 1083 (1959); Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of Evidence
Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229; Parsons, State-Federal
Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 346 (1957);
57 COLuM. L. REv. 1159 (1957); 51 COLuM. L. REv. 128 (1951); 27 GEO. WASH. L
REv. 392 (1959); 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 703 (1959); 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948); Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2d 573 (1956).
51. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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applied the fourth amendment to the states in 1949, lower courts
continued to uphold the "silver platter" doctrine until 1960 when the
Supreme Court explicitly overruled it in the case of Elkins v. United
States.' " As Wolf had held that unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officials violated the Constitution, the court in Elkins was con-
cerned with deterring illegal state action.53 Justice Stewart's majority
opinion also relied in part on the judicial integrity rationale,54 however,
as well as on the need to eradicate the pragmatic difficulties associated
with the "silver platter" doctrine.5" In 1961, when the Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio 6 applied the exclusionary rule to the states,
the source of the problem disappeared and the "silver platter" doctrine
became an historical curiosity. Courts after Mapp no longer distin-
guished between state and federal officials in deciding whether to apply
the exclusionary rule."7
Prior to Janis, five courts decided cases involving tax assessments
based primarily on evidence illegally seized by state officials.58  Four
of these excluded the evidence entirely. 59 The Tax Court, in Suarez
V. Commissioner,0 applied the rule after a thorough discussion of the
relevant case law. Suarez quoted the Supreme Court's admonition in
Weeks that the fourth amendment applies to all persons, not only those
accused of a crime,"' and its injunction in Silverthorne against any use
of illegally acquired evidence."" The court held that deterrence of state
police misconduct and judicial integrity justified application of the rule,63
52. 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see Eichner, The "Silver Platter"-No Longer for Serving
Evidence in Federal Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311 (1960).
53. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
54. Id. at 222-23.
55. Id. at 221-22.
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. United States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,474 (D.D.C. 1966). See gen-
erally notes 38 & 46 supra.
58. See Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v.
$5,608.30 in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964); Ander-
son v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Chase 67-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 84,474 (D.D.C. 1966); Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
59. See United States v. $5,608.30 in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d
359 (7th Cir. 1964); Anderson v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Uni-
ted States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,474 (D.D.C. 1966); Suarez v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 792 (1972).
60. 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
61. Id. at 802.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 805.
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noting that the adverse consequences to society resulting from exclusion
of evidence were far less serious in civil than in criminal proceedings. 4
The fifth case, Compton v. United States, 5 admitted the tainted evi-
dence, but did so solely to impeach taxpayer's testimony, a recognized
exception to the exclusionary rule.06 The court in Compton did not
consider the admissibility of such tainted evidence as part of the Govern-
ment's case in chief. 7 Before Janis, therefore, courts uniformly applied
the exclusionary rule in federal proceedings to enforce the gambling
tax, regardless of whether state or federal officials had obtained the
tainted evidence. 8
In United States v. Janis,"' the United States Supreme Court analyzed
the exclusionary rule primarily in terms of deterrence. Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, relegated judicial integrity to a single
footnote,70 arguing the doctrine meant only that "the courts must not
commit or encourage violations of the Constitution."7' The Court
reasoned that if the exclusionary rule were actually a strong deterrent,
its continued application in state and federal criminal proceedings would
deter police misconduct; the additional marginal deterrence upon state
officials by excluding from federal civil proceedings evidence illegally
acquired by state officials would be minimal. 2 Conversely, if the rule
had little deterrent value in criminal cases, there was no reason to
extend it to civil proceedings. 73 In either event, the sanction-excluding
evidence from federal civil proceedings-was too remote to deter state
police misbehavior.
The Court distinguished prior case law in several ways. Justice
Blackmun stressed that Elkins involved application of the exclusionary
rule in a criminal proceeding; Janis was merely a civil tax assessment. 4
Excluding the tainted evidence from all criminal trials already sub-
stantially frustrates a primary concern of state police; any increased
64. Id.
65. 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964).
66. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
67. 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964).
68. See note 41 supra.
69. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
70. Id. at 458-59 n.35.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 453-54.
73. Id. at 454.
74. Id. at 458.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/11
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deterrence from extending the rule to civil cases would be small .7 The
Court found cases applying the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings
inapposite for two reasons. First, they had ignored the distinction
between "inter- and intrasovereign" use of illegally acquired evidence. 7 ,
Excluding evidence from a federal civil suit would have no more than
a "highly attenuated" deterrent effect on state officers. 7 Second,
while these cases had relied in part on judicial integrity as an indepen-
dent rationale for excluding the evidence,"8 the Janis Court believed
its deterrence analysis encompassed integrity.79
The Court also cited three cases admitting illegally acquired evidence
in "proceedings other than strictly criminal prosecutions."' 0 Two dealt
with postconviction proceedings: United States ex rel. Sperling v.
Fitzpatrick,"' a parole revocation case, and United States v. Schipani,s2
a case in which the sentence was based largely on tainted evidence."8 The
third case, Compton v. United States,"4 was a civil tax assessment case
"remarkably like" Janis8
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that judicial integ-
rity is a distinct and sound basis for excluding tainted evidence.8 6 In
a separate dissent, Justice Stewart contended that because the wagering
tax was designed to assist the states in enforcing their gambling laws,
the majority's civil-criminal distinction was irrelevant;8 7 Janis was there-
fore indistinguishable from Elkins.
Janis breaks new ground in the Burger Court's continued war on
the exclusionary rule. Although the Court had not previously addressed
75. Id. at 448.
76. Id. at 457-58.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 458-59 n.35.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 456.
81. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
82. 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
83. The Court evidently confused its terminology in characterizing Sperling as an
"intrasovereign" case, and Schipani as an "intersovereign" case. The evidence used in
federal court in Sperling had been illegally seized by state officials. 426 F.2d at 1162.
In Schipani, federal officials acquired all of the tainted evidence used by the federal
court. See United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253, 255 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 435
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); United States v. Schipani,
289 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
84 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964).
85. 428 U.S. at 456.
86. Id. at 460.
87. Id. at 461.
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these precise facts, the principles of Boyd, Elkins, and Plymouth Sedan
required application of the exclusionary rule. In the context of a crim-
inal case, Elkins had rejected the majority's critical distinction between
intersovereign and intrasovereign violations.88 The Court neither dis-
cussed nor refuted the reasoning in that case. Instead, the majority
sought to escape its force by characterizing Janis as a civil case. That
distinction, however, flies in the face of the longstanding Boyd-Plymouth
Sedan line of cases applying the exclusionary rule to such civil actions
as wagering tax assessments, designed primarily to supplement criminal
proceedings. 89
Sperling, Schipani, and Compton provide little support for the majority
result. Contrary to the majority's assertion, Schipani involved no
"intersovereign" use of illegally acquired evidence: federal officials
seized the evidence that later appeared in a presentence report in fed-
eral court.90 Sperling did involve an "intersovereign" use of tainted
evidence. The United States Board of Parole revoked a parole on the
basis of evidence illegally acquired by state officials. Neither the
parole board nor the reviewing courts, however, thought the inter-
sovereign nature of the use was of any importance.91 The court in
Compton admitted the tainted evidence solely to impeach the taxpayer's
testimony and explicitly declined to rule on its admissibility as part of
the Government's case in chief. 2 Compton did sustain an assessment
based solely on illegally acquired evidence. That result, however,
rested on the court's resolution of an intricate burden of proof issue, 8 a
resolution that the Janis Court explicitly assumed to be incorrect.9 4
Prior case law, then, provided no support for the majority result.
88. 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 47 supra.
90. See United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), afi'd, 435
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). See also United States v.
Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
91. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
92. Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 1964).
93. Id. at 215-16.
94. 428 U.S. at 441-43. Whether the taxpayer challenges the Commissioner's
assessment in the Tax Court or pays the tax and seeks a refund in federal district court,
the assessment is presumed correct and the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. Comp-
ton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964); 9 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX § 50.71 (1971). If the assessment is utterly without foundation, however, the pre-
sumption does not apply. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1935). Whether
an assessment is utterly without foundation if it rests on evidence inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule is an open question. Compare Pizzarello v. United States, 408
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The majority's view of the probable deterrent effect of applying the
exclusionary rule in these circumstances is equally suspect. The wager-
ing excise tax was designed primarily to assist state officials in enforcing
state laws against organized gambling.9 5 In effect, the tax operates as
a fine on illegal gambling. Accordingly, state officials can substantially
accomplish their objective-increasing the effective risk of illegal
gambling-by ignoring the constitutional limits on search and seizure
and presenting the fruits of their misconduct to the IRS for use in federal
tax proceedings. For searches and seizures aimed at illegal gamblers,
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule virtually disappears.
On a more fundamental level, the court's framework of analysis is
an unsatisfactory means to determine the merits of the exclusionary rule.
The Burger Court has attacked the exclusionary rule in part, because
deterrence, its major justification, is a nebulous concept that has proved
incapable of measurement. "Marginal" deterrence is a still more elusive
concept, however; the marginal benefit of the exclusionary rule is thus
necessarily intangible. By contrast, the cost of imposing an exclusion-
ary rule-ignoring highly relevant and often conclusive evidence-is
immediate and apparent. A balancing process that weighs the intangible
and abstract against the concrete and obvious is inherently biased in
favor of the latter,96 particularly when the court itself is so inclined.
The marginal deterrence technique is therefore an outcome determina-
tive method of analysis in all but the most unusual circumstances.
The implications of Janis for the future of the exclusionary rule are
not entirely clear. The resurrection of the "silver platter" doctrine casts
doubt on the continued vitality of Elkins. Although the Court relied
in part on the civil-criminal distinction, that rationale cannot withstand
analysis.17 Suits to enforce the wagering tax, although civil in form,
are part and parcel of the joint federal-state criminal scheme to combat
F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969) (assessment based on tainted evidence is invalid), with
Compton, 334 F.2d at 218 (even if assessment is invalid, plaintiff must shoulder burden
of proving proper amount of refund). Compton held in effect that illegal acquisition
of the evidence on which the assessment rested did not affect the presumption of validity.
Taxpayer's testimony in an attempt to meet her burden was effectively impeached by the
tainted evidence, leaving intact the presumption of validity. 334 F.2d at 218. The Janis
Court, however, explicitly assumed that the taxpayer must prevail if the IRS could not
present the evidence seized by state officers. 428 U.S. at 441-43. In short, Tanis
relied on Compton after explicitly assuming that it was wrongly decided.
95. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 1
96. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HAnv. L. Rnv. 1329, 1361-62 (1971).
97. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
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organized gambling. 9  The heart of the Janis opinion-the Court's
distinction between intersovereign and intrasovereign violations-has
ominous implications for Elkins. To be sure, the Court's marginal
deterrence analysis did presume illegally acquired evidence would be
excluded from all criminal proceedings, federal or state. 9 The emphasis
in Janis on the "highly attenuated" deterrent effect of closing the courts
of one sovereign to the policemen of another0 0 is, however, a direct
attack on the Elkins reasoning. Should the Court employ marginal
deterrence analysis in a re-examination of Elkins, the "silver platter"
doctrine might well reappear in its original form.
Janis apparently has also resolved the future of the judicial integrity
rationale as an independent basis for the exclusionary rule. Janis holds
that judicial integrity is unimpaired so long as courts do not encourage
constitutional violations.'01 If the exclusionary rule has no deterrent
value in a particular setting, however, admitting illegally obtained evi-
dence will not encourage illegal conduct and accordingly will not
jeopardize the courts' integrity no matter how egregious the conduct of
the police. Although previous cases had minimized its value, 102 judicial
integrity has become, under Janis, no more than a variant method of
stating the deterrence rationale.10 3
If the Court did mean to reject completely the integrity of the judi-
ciary as an independent basis for the exclusionary rule, the decision
was unfortunate. Properly stated, the integrity rationale asserts that
courts are degraded-in their own eyes and in the eyes of the public-
by hearing tainted evidence, regardless of the extent to which refusing
to do so will deter future constitutional violations. 0 4  The cases ex-
cluding evidence obtained by methods that shock the conscience of the
court were explicitly based on the concept of judicial integrity.108 Surely
98. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
99. 428 U.S. at 448.
100. Id. at 457-58.
101. Id. at 458-59 n.35.
102. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
103. The Court apparently realized this fact. See 428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35 ("this
inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a
deterrent purpose").
104. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
105. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Justice Frankfurter for the
Court stated:
Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.
So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned
[Vol. 1977:127
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the Janis Court did not mean to permit introduction of evidence ac-
quired through physical coercion unless the defendant could demonstrate
a measurable deterrent effect from exclusion.
Moreover, discarding the judicial integrity rationale may have de-
prived the Court of a principled basis for limiting the exclusionary rule
to cases in which the police acted in bad faith, a restriction at which
the Court has hinted several times.:"" The validity of the deterrence
rationale is no more capable of empirical verification in the bad faith
situation than in other cases. A proper statement of the judicial integ-
rity rationale, however, provides a sound reason for distinguishing
between good and bad faith police misconduct: The judiciary has
indeed degraded itself-both in its own eyes and in the eyes of the
public-if it shares in the fruits of deliberate constitutional violations.
If the Court eventually does elect to apply an exclusionary rule only
in cases of bad faith police action, judicial integrity is the most easily
defensible rationale.
In holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to tainted evidence ac-
quired by state officials and used in federal civil proceedings, United
States v. Janis constitutes a clear break from prior case law. The de-
cision abandons judicial integrity as a rationale for the exclusionary
rule and paves the way for complete reinstatement of the "silver platter"
doctrine. Whether the Court will follow these logical implications of
its decision remains to be seen.
by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the
cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby
to brutalize the temper of a society.
Id. at 173-74.
106. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-42 (1975). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446-50 & n.25 (1974) (Miranda warnings).
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